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Linking functional with personal income distribution:  
A stock-flow consistent approach 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The distribution of income is traditionally a core issue in economic theory and policy 
analysis. So far, economists have mostly focused on two types of income distribution: the 
distribution among the factors of production (functional income distribution) and the 
distribution among the members of the society (personal income distribution). However, the 
vast majority of the existing theoretical frameworks examines these two types of income 
distribution separately. There is still a lack of an integrated framework that connects income 
inequality at the micro level with factor shares at the macro level.  
 
The absence of such a framework does not square with the fact that people in different income 
brackets receive income from different sources (labour, interest, distributed profits etc.) or 
from the same sources in different proportions. From this it follows that any change in 
functional income distribution has non-trivial effects on the way that income is distributed 
among the members of the society. The absence of such a framework is also at odds with the 
findings of various empirical works in which significant links between functional and 
personal income distribution are documented. As Atkinson (2009) points out, our 
understanding of inequalities could substantially be enhanced if the macro and the micro 
perspectives on income distribution were to be unified. 
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This paper argues that the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach to macroeconomic modelling 
can provide the appropriate analytical platform for linking functional with personal income 
distribution. The SFC approach can be traced back to the works of the Cambridge Economic 
Policy Group (see e.g. Cripps and Godley 1976) and the Yale group of James Tobin (see e.g. 
Backus et al. 1980; Tobin 1982). Although this approach was largely sidetracked from the 
mid 1980s to the late 1990s, it has gained a resurgence of interest over the last decade or so 
largely due to the works of Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie (see, for instance, Lavoie and 
Godley 2001-2; Godley and Lavoie 2007). 
 
The defining feature of the SFC approach is the explicit integration of accounting into 
dynamic macro modelling.  In SFC models the stocks (deposits, equities, loans etc.) and the 
flows (interest, profits, wages etc.) of the institutional sectors of the macroeconomy are 
explicitly depicted via balance sheet and transactions matrices. This allows an integrated 
consideration of the macro implications of stock-flow consistency. It also allows a detailed 
analysis of the links between the financial and the real spheres of the economy as well as 
between income and wealth.   
 
There are three reasons why the stock-flow consistent framework is an appropriate platform 
for the analysis of the links between functional and personal income distribution. First, the 
formulation of the connections between functional and personal income distribution requires 
the separation of the household sector into various groups, which are characterised by 
different income sources and balance sheet structures. The complex stock-flow interactions 
between these groups and the other sectors of the economy (e.g. firms, banks and the 
government) need to be rigorously modelled if the analysis is to be consistent and 
illuminating. The SFC framework ensures such a coherent modelling.  
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Second, the dynamic interaction between income and wealth plays a major role in the way 
that functional income distribution affects personal income inequality. Households with more 
wealth typically receive income from more sources than households with less wealth. Hence, 
the more unequal the allocation of wealth the more personal income distribution is responsive 
to changes in the wealth-related income sources (such as interest or profits). Furthermore, any 
change in factor shares affects in a heterogeneous way the savings of households, modifying 
the distribution of wealth and, hence, the distribution of personal income. The crucial role of 
the interconnected trajectories in which wealth and income evolve can successfully be 
considered within an SFC framework. 
 
Third, functional income distribution dynamically interacts with personal income distribution 
through the macroeconomic system. This interaction takes place in two stages. In the first 
stage, both types of income distribution affect macroeconomic activity. Functional income 
distribution influences consumption, because of the different propensities to consume out of 
different types of income; it also influences investment primarily due to its impact on 
profitability and the utilisation rate.
1
 Personal income distribution affects consumption 
expenditures since the same source of income is likely to be distributed to households with 
different propensities to consume (see Carvalho and Rezai 2014; Palley 2015). In the second 
stage, distribution-induced changes in economic activity influence the bargaining power of 
workers in the wage-setting procedure and the ability of firms to increase the prices of their 
products, with profound effects on the income distribution between wages and profits; they 
also influence the proportion of households that receive income from unemployment benefits 
and, potentially, the distribution of the wage bill among households. SFC modelling provides 
a platform for the direct incorporation of all the above-mentioned effects.  
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The purpose of this paper is to use the SFC approach in order to develop a benchmark 
framework that links functional with personal income distribution through the interaction of 
heterogeneous stocks and flows. In our framework income inequality is reflected in the way 
that income is distributed among certain household groups with heterogeneous skills, wealth 
and income sources. Functional distribution is captured by the way that income is distributed 
between factors (wages, profits, unemployment benefits and interest).  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature. 
Section 3 lays out the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the inequality indices utilised in 
the model and describes the source-decomposition procedure, which allows us to link 
functional with personal income distribution. Section 5 provides the results of our simulation 
exercises designed to illustrate the various ways through which functional and personal 
income distribution interact in our benchmark model. Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Links between functional and personal income distribution: A brief review of the 
literature  
 
The effects of functional income distribution on personal income distribution have been 
investigated in many empirical studies. The majority of these studies explores these effects 
employing inequality decomposition techniques that permit the estimation of the income 
sources’ contribution to total income inequality (see e.g. Jenkins 1995; Jännti 1997; 
Papatheodorou 1998; Fräßdorf, Grabka and Schwarze 2011; OECD 2011; García-Peñalosa 
and Orgiazzi 2013; Wolff and Zacharias 2013). Although the results differ across countries 
and time periods, some common findings are the important contribution of capital and self-
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employment income to total inequality, the equalising role of social transfers and taxes and 
the significant effects of wage inequality on total inequality.  
 
The influence of functional on personal income distribution has also been examined in studies 
that use econometric techniques. Employing a sample of developed and developing countries, 
Daudey and García-Peñalosa (2007) find that a higher labour income share is associated with 
lower inequality. A similar result is reported by Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2010) for a 
panel of OECD countries. Schlenker and Schmid (2013) utilise data for EU countries and find 
that personal income distribution depends significantly on capital income shares.  
 
A novel empirical analysis of the links between functional and personal income distribution 
(without the use of econometrics) is provided by Piketty (2014). Employing a new historical 
dataset that covers many economies and a very long period of time, he argues that changes in 
the capital income share are among the principal drivers of the evolution of inequality in the 
long run. This primarily stems from the fact that capital income is traditionally much more 
unequally distributed than labour income.   
 
Despite this empirical evidence, the theoretical models on the link between functional and 
personal income distribution are rare. Dagum (1999), Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2010) 
and Palley (2015) are some exceptions. Dagum (1999) puts forward a non-linear income 
generating function according to which economic units’ income depends on their human 
capital and wealth. Utilising this function as a basis for his analysis, he provides a theoretical 
framework for the joint examination of functional and personal income distribution. Checchi 
and García-Peñalosa (2010) develop a model in which the economy is composed of four types 
of agents: unemployed, unskilled workers, skilled workers that receive no capital income, and 
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skilled workers that receive both labour and capital income. The Gini coefficient is suitably 
formulated to express personal income inequality as a function of the labour share (and 
various other factors). In their static framework, a rise in the labour share has opposing effects 
on inequality: on the one hand, it tends to reduce it by narrowing the income differential 
between capital and non-capital owners; on the other hand, it tends to increase it by raising 
the income gap between employed and unemployed agents. Palley (2015) develops a neo-
Kaleckian-Goodwin model with three classes: workers, a middle-management middle class 
and a top management capitalist class. Personal income distribution is captured by the 
distribution of wage income between workers and middle managers. Functional and personal 
income distributions are linked since the latter is postulated to depend on the employment rate 
and the capacity utilisation rate, both of which rely on functional income distribution.  
 
The theoretical model of this paper is closer in spirit to Palley’s model in which (contrary to 
the other two models) the linkage between personal and functional income distribution is 
formulated as part of a complete macroeconomic system. However, our SFC model moves 
beyond Palley’s work in various important ways: it contains more household groups and more 
income sources; personal income distribution is captured by inequality indices; the links 
between functional and personal income distribution are explored using inequality 
decomposition techniques; there is an explicit formulation of the financial system and the 
balance sheet structure of households that allows a richer consideration of the interaction 
between income and wealth. Moreover, contrary to all aforementioned models, the model of 
this paper is dynamic in nature: it explicitly tracks the stocks and flows of the macroeconomy 
in a sequential manner.  
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3. The model 
 
The postulated economy consists of households, firms, an unemployment fund and 
commercial banks. The household sector is divided into five groups: 
(1) Households headed by a low-skilled employed worker. Their income comes from the 
wage received by their head. They do not save. 
(2) Households headed by a low-skilled unemployed. They receive the unemployment 
benefit. Their head is available to work in a low-skilled job. They do not save. 
(3) Households headed by a high-skilled employed worker. Their income comes from the 
wage received by their head (which is higher than the wage of a low-skilled worker) and the 
interest paid on their accumulated deposits. 
(4) Households headed by a high-skilled unemployed. They receive the unemployment 
benefit and the interest on their accumulated deposits. Their head is available to work in a 
high-skilled job.
2
 
(5) Households headed by entrepreneurs-capital owners. They are the owners of the 
enterprises and have accumulated a large amount of wealth (equities and deposits). They 
receive only capital income in the form of interest and distributed profits. 
 
Households move between groups (1) and (2), according to the demand for low-skilled jobs. 
Movements also occur between groups (3) and (4) when there are alterations in the demand 
for high-skilled jobs. It is assumed that low-skilled agents cannot become high-skilled ones by 
investing in human capital. Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary complications, it is postulated 
that high-skilled agents do not work in low-skilled jobs. Consequently, the proportion of the 
sum of households (1) and (2) and of the sum of households (3) and (4) in total household 
population is exogenously given. Future extensions of the model could allow these 
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proportions to change endogenously as a result of low-skilled workers’ investment in human 
capital and variations in the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled labour. The 
consideration of intergenerational mobility could also be an important extension of the current 
simplified formulation.   
 
All households are assumed to have the same size and composition. The head of the 
household is the only income provider. Hence, personal income distribution coincides with 
household income distribution. Furthermore, it has been posited that the households that 
belong to the same group have identical income (and wealth). This allows us to focus on 
between group inequality, avoiding the complications that stem from within group inequality 
as a result of differences in microeconomic characteristics (such as age, health and personal 
skills). 
 
Firms run investment projects using both internal funds (retained profits) and external finance 
(equities and loans). A part of their profits is distributed to the households of entrepreneurs-
capital owners. Commercial banks provide loans to firms and deposits constitute their only 
liability. Their profits are all distributed to the households of entrepreneurs-capital owners, 
who are assumed to be the owners of banks (for simplicity, bank equity is assumed away). 
The unemployment fund, which is financed by the employees’ and employers’ contribution, 
provides unemployment benefits. 
 
Since the aim of this paper is to set up a benchmark model for the analysis of the effects of 
functional on personal income distribution, a number of simplifying assumptions for the 
structure of the macroeconomy have been adopted: there are no government expenditures and 
taxes; unemployment benefits are the only social transfers; income from self-employment is 
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not explicitly considered; there is no housing market and thus no income from rent; 
households do not take out loans from commercial banks. The banking sector has been kept 
simple: there are no central bank interventions and commercial banks are portrayed as passive 
intermediaries that provide all loans demanded by firms. Inflation has been assumed away and 
the price level of output has been set equal to unity (i.e. variables’ nominal and real values 
coincide). Future extensions of the model can relax these assumptions, investigating how the 
results of our benchmark analysis can be modified when various complications of the reality 
are taken into account.
3
 
 
Table 1 shows the balance sheets of the economy’s sectors. Symbols with a plus sign 
represent assets and symbols with a negative sign indicate liabilities. Table 2 depicts the 
transactions between the sectors. In the case of firms and commercial banks, a distinction is 
made between current and capital transactions. Symbols with a plus sign denote inflows. 
Symbols with a negative sign depict outflows. The columns of the matrix represent the budget 
constraints of the sectors.  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
We proceed to describe the equations of the model. The subscript “-1” is used to denote the 
values of the endogenous variables in the previous period.  
 
3.1 Households of low-skilled employed workers 
 
(1 )LE L W LEY w N                                                                                          (1) 
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LE LEC Y                                                                                                             (2) 
/LE LE LEYH Y N                                                                                                     (3) 
 
The disposable income of low-skilled employed workers ( LEY ) equals their wage bill minus 
their contributions to the unemployment fund (equation 1); Lw is their wage rate, LEN  is the 
number of low-skilled employed workers and W  is the part of the wage rate paid to the 
unemployment fund as employee contribution. Equation (2) shows the consumption 
expenditures of low-skilled employed workers’ households ( LEC ). The income per household 
( LEYH ) is defined in equation (3).  
 
3.2 Households of low-skilled unemployed workers 
 
LU L LEN N N                                                                                                            (4) 
1 ( / )L LE Lur N N                                                                                                       (5) 
Lub w                                                                                                                 (6) 
LU LUY ub N                                                                                                            (7) 
LU LUC Y                                                                                                               (8) 
/LU LU LUYH Y N                                                                                                     (9) 
 
The number of households of low-skilled unemployed workers ( LUN ) is given by equation 
(4); LN  is the total number of households headed by a low-skilled worker (employed or 
unemployed). The rate of unemployment for low-skilled workers ( Lur ) is defined in equation 
(5). The unemployment benefit rate ( ub ) is a proportion ( ) of the wage rate of low-skilled 
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workers (equation 6). Equation (7) gives the disposable income of the low-skilled 
unemployed workers’ households ( LUY ). Equation (8) shows their consumption ( LUC ). The 
income per household ( LUYH ) is defined in equation (9). 
 
3.3 Households of high-skilled employed workers 
 
1(1 )HE H W HE M HEY w N r M                                                                                   (10) 
 1 1 2 1 1( / )HE HE HE HE HE HE HEC N c YH c M N                                                                         (11) 
Δ HE HE HEM Y C MT                                                                                                   (12) 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( / ) ( ) ( / )HU HU HE HE HU HU HU HUMT z N N M N z N N M N                                       (13) 
1 1z   iff 1HU HUN N  ; otherwise 1 0z                                                                     (14) 
2 1z   iff 1HU HUN N  ; otherwise 2 0z                                                                   (15) 
/HE HE HEYH Y N                                                                                             (16) 
 
Equation (10) gives the disposable income of high-skilled employed workers’ households 
( HEY ); Hw  is their wage rate, HEN  is the number of high-skilled employed workers, Mr  is the 
interest rate on deposits and 1HEM   stands for their lagged accumulated deposits. The 
consumption expenditures ( HEC ) are defined in equation (11). Following Godley and Lavoie 
(2007), a Modigliani-type consumption function has been adopted. Thus, the consumption of 
each household relies on the expected disposable income of the household ( 1HEYH  ) and the 
past accumulated wealth; 1HEc   is the propensity to consume out of income and 2HEc  is the 
propensity to consume out of wealth ( 2 10 1HE HEc c   ). Total consumption is derived by 
multiplying the consumption of each household (the term in the bracket) by the number of 
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households. Note that all households in the model are assumed to exhibit a simple form of 
adaptive expectations according to which their expected income and wealth are given by the 
per household lagged income and wealth in their group.   
 
Equation (12) reflects households’ budget constraint. When the households of high-skilled 
workers change group, as a result of alterations in the unemployment rate, they bring with 
them their accumulated wealth. At the aggregate level, this wealth needs to be added to the 
total wealth of their new group and to be subtracted from the total wealth of their previous 
group. This is ensured by incorporating the term MT  in the budget constraint. This term 
denotes the amount of deposits that is added to the group of high-skilled employed workers. 
Equations (13), (14) and (15) show that this term is positive when unemployment decreases 
(i.e. 1HU HUN N  ) and negative when unemployment rises (i.e. 1HU HUN N  ); HUN  denotes 
the number of unemployed high-skilled workers and 1HUM   is their lagged accumulated 
deposits.
4 
The income per household of high-skilled employed workers is defined in equation 
(16). 
 
3.4 Households of high-skilled unemployed workers 
 
HU H HEN N N                                                                                                  (17) 
1 ( / )H HE Hur N N                                                                                              (18) 
1HU HU M HUY ub N r M                                                                                        (19) 
 1 1 2 1 1( / )HU HU HU HU HU HU HUC N c YH c M N                                                                        (20) 
HU HU HUM Y C MT                                                                                         (21) 
/HU HU HUYH Y N                                                                                            (22) 
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The number of households headed by a high-skilled unemployed worker is given by equation 
(17); HN  is the total number of high-skilled workers’ households (employed or unemployed). 
Equation (18) defines the unemployment rate for high-skilled workers ( Hur ) and equation (19) 
describes the disposable income of the unemployed ones ( HUY ). Equation (20) is the 
Modigliani-type consumption function where HUC  is the total consumption of high-skilled 
unemployed workers, 1HUYH   is the lagged disposable income per household, 1HUc  is the 
propensity to consume out of income and 2HUc  is the propensity to consume out of wealth. 
Note that, since the income of unemployed high-skilled workers is lower than that of 
employed ones, it is reasonable to postulate that 1 1HU HEc c  and 2 2HU HEc c . Equation (21) 
shows the budget constraint for the households of high-skilled unemployed workers. Equation 
(22) defines the income per household. 
 
3.5 Households of entrepreneurs-capital owners  
 
1E M EY DP BP r M                                                                                        (23) 
1 1 2 1E E E E EC c Y c V                                                                                     (24) 
E E EV Y C CG                                                                                             (25) 
1Δ  epCG e                                                                                              (26) 
1 1e
DP CG
re
p e 



                                                                                        (27) 
0 1 1 2 3 1 1 1[ ( / )]M E E EE re r Y V V                                                             (28) 
0 1 1 2 3 1 1 1[(1 ) ( / )]E M E E EM re r Y V V                                                     (29n) 
E EM V E                                                                                                       (29) 
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/E E EYH Y N                                                                                       (30) 
 
The disposable income of entrepreneurs-capital owners’ households ( EY ) consists of firms’ 
distributed profits (DP), banks’ profits (BP) and the interest on their accumulated deposits 
( 1EM  ) (equation 23). In the Modigliani-type consumption function, described in equation 
(24), EC  denotes the consumption expenditures, EV  is the wealth of entrepreneurs-capital 
owners’ households ( E E eV M p e   ), 1Ec  is the propensity to consume out of income and 2Ec  
is the propensity to consume out of wealth; it is postulated that 1 1E HEc c  and 2 2E HEc c . The 
budget constraint is given by identity (25). The capital gains on equities ( CG ) are defined in 
equation (26); e  is the number of equities and ep  denotes their price. The rate of return of 
equities ( re ) is the sum of distributed profits and capital gains, divided by the lagged value of 
equities (equation 27). 
 
The households of entrepreneurs-capital owners hold their wealth in the form of equities (E) 
and deposits. Their portfolio choice, captured by equations (28) and (29n), relies on Godley’s 
(1999) formulation of imperfect asset substitutability. This formulation suggests that the share 
of households’ wealth held in the form equities and deposits has an exogenous and an 
endogenous component. The exogenous component, which is represented by parameters 0  
and 01  , reflects exogenous factors that influence households’ asset choice (e.g. the 
perceived degree of uncertainty). The endogenous component captures the response of asset 
allocation to alterations in the relative rates on return and the transactions demand for money.   
According to the balance sheet matrix, equation (29) must always hold. Therefore, equation 
(29n) is replaced by equation (29) in the computer simulations. Recall that due to the 
simplifying assumption of adaptive expectations, households’ expected wealth is proxied by 
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its lagged value. Equation (30) defines the income per household ( EYH ); EN is the number of 
households headed by entrepreneurs-capital owners.  
 
3.6  Firms 
 
Y C I                                                                                                           (31) 
LE LU HE HU EC C C C C C                                                                              (32) 
L LE H HEW w N w N                                                                                        (33) 
1(1 )F LTP Y W r L                                                                                        (34) 
fRP s TP                                                                                                      (35) 
DP TP RP                                                                                                    (36) 
/LE LN Y                                                                                                 (37) 
* /HE HN Y                                                                                                   (38) 
1 (1 )L L g                                                                                                (39) 
1 (1 )H H g                                                                                                       (40) 
*Y v K                                                                                                        (41) 
*/u Y Y                                                                                                         (42) 
L W Lw s                                                                                                          (43) 
0 1 1W Ls w w ur                                                                                                 (44) 
1(1 ) ( (1 ) ) /H W L L LE W L HE L HEw m w h Y w N m w N r L N                                               (45) 
0 1 1 1 2 1 1[ ( / ) ]I d d RP K d u K                                                                                          (46) 
IK                (47) 
( / )ee x I p                                                                                                             (48) 
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Δ eL I RP e p                                                                                                (49) 
eEpe /                                                                                                           (50) 
 
According to equation (31), output produced by firms (Y) equals total consumption (C) plus 
investment (I). Total consumption is given by equation (32). Equation (33) defines the wage 
bill (W) and equation (34) shows the total profits of firms (TP); F  is the rate of employer 
contributions and Lr  is the interest rate on loans (L). A proportion ( fs ) of firms’ total profits 
is retained for investment purposes (equation 35); retained profits are denoted by RP. The 
remaining amount of profits (DP) is distributed to the households of entrepreneurs-capital 
owners (equation 36). 
 
Following Lavoie (2009), the demand for low-skilled workers is postulated to depend on 
output (equation 37), while the demand for high-skilled workers is, according to equation 
(38), proportional to full-capacity output ( *Y ). The symbols L  and H  denote the labour 
productivity of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, respectively. The productivity in our 
benchmark setup is posited to grow at an exogenously given rate ( g ); see equations (39) and 
(40). In future extensions of the model labour productivity can become endogenous following, 
for instance, Cassetti (2003), Naastepad (2006) and Palley (2015).  Equation (41) defines the 
full-capacity output; v  is the technologically given full-capacity output-to-capital ratio; K 
denotes firms’ capital stock. Equation (42) gives the rate of capacity utilisation (u).  
 
The wage rate of low-skilled workers is determined through a bargaining procedure in which 
workers negotiate their wage rate with reference to labour productivity (the latter is known 
when bargaining takes place). Equation (43) shows that the wage rate is a proportion ( Ws ) of 
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labour productivity. Since the price level is equal to 1, Ws  is the share of low-skilled workers’ 
wages in total income. When workers achieve a wage growth that is higher (lower) than 
labour productivity growth, their wage share increases (decreases). Equation (44) states that 
the wage share that low-skilled workers can attain in the bargaining procedure relies on: (i) 
0w , which reflects the exogenous factors associated with the institutional structure of the 
labour market, and (ii) the rate of unemployment. The negative impact of the rate of 
unemployment on the wage share of low-skilled workers reflects the ‘reserve army affect’ 
(see e.g. Stockhammer 2004).  
 
Τhe wage rate of high-skilled workers is determined through a scheme that incorporates profit 
sharing: in addition to a base wage rate, high-skilled workers receive a variable remuneration 
linked to firms’ profits.5 Thus, the overall wage rate is set as a weighted average of the base 
wage rate and the profit-linked remuneration (equation 45).
6
 The parameter   denotes the 
relative importance of profit sharing in the determination of high-skilled workers’ wage rate 
( 0 1  ). The base wage rate of high-skilled workers is Wm  times the wage rate of low-
skilled ones, where 1Wm   is a kind of skill premium;  Ps h   is the proportion of per high-
skilled worker profits that is allocated to high-skilled workers ( 0 1Ps  ).
7  
The profits out of 
which the profit-linked remuneration is estimated are equal to the sales of firms minus the 
wage bill of low-skilled workers, the wage bill of high-skilled workers (without including 
their profit-linked remuneration) and the interest payments of firms.  
 
Equation (46) is the investment function; 0d , 1d  and 2d  are parameters. We have opted for a 
simple specification which postulates that capital accumulation depends positively on the 
(lagged) rate of retained profits and the (lagged) rate of capacity utilisation (see e.g. Rowthorn 
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1982; Dutt 1984). Equation (47) shows the change in capital stock (capital depreciation has 
been assumed away). Following Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), it is postulated that firms 
finance a fraction ( x ) of their investment expenditures via equity emission. This is described 
by equation (48). Loans from commercial banks close the gap between the desired investment 
expenditures and the funding that comes from retained profits and equity emission (equation 
49). Equation (50) reflects the stock market equilibrium. 
 
3.7 Unemployment fund 
 
( )W FCO W                                                                                                   (51) 
( )LU HUUB ub N N                                                                                             (52) 
1F M FM CO UB r M                                                                                              (53) 
 
Equation (51) gives the sum of employee and employer contributions (CO). The total amount 
of unemployment benefits (UB) is defined in equation (52). The part of the contributions not 
used for the provision of unemployment benefits is saved in the form of deposits ( FM ). 
Equation (53) reflects the budget constraint of the unemployment fund.   
 
3.8 Commercial banks 
 
1 1L MBP r L r M                                                                                                 (54) 
HE HU E FM M M M M                                                                                          (55) 
L Mr spr r                                                                                                      (56) 
M L                                                                                                              (57r) 
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Equation (54) gives commercial banks’ profits. Total deposits (M) are defined in equation 
(55). Equation (56) shows that the interest rate on loans equals the deposit interest rate plus a 
fixed spread ( spr ). Equation (57r) is the ‘redundant’ identity of the model. The accounting 
logic suggests that this identity always holds. Thus, it is not included in the solution of the 
model. However, in the simulations it is necessary to verify that this identity is indeed 
realised.   
 
4. Income inequality: indices and decomposition by income source 
 
Income inequality is measured by three broadly used indices: the Gini coefficient (GINI), the 
squared coefficient of variation ( 2C ) and the Atkinson index with 2  ( 2A );   is the 
inequality aversion parameter.  
 
GINI is written as: 
 
2
1
2
i j i j
j i
GINI YH YH N N
N 
   
 
                                                                  (58) 
 
where L H EN N N N   , , , , , ,i j LE LU HE HU E  and   is the mean household income defined 
as /TY N  ; TY  is the total household income ( T LE LU HE HU EY Y Y Y Y Y     ).  
 
2C  is expressed as: 
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2
1
( )i i
i
C N YH
N


  

                                                                                       (59) 
 
where , , , ,i LE LU HE HU E . 
 
2A  is given by: 
 
1
1
2
1
1 ii
i
YH
A N
N





  
     
   
  (60) 
 
where , , , ,i LE LU HE HU E . 
  
All these indices take a minimum value of 0 when there is perfect equality. For GINI and 
2A  the maximum value is 1 (perfect inequality). There is no upper bound for 
2C . The 
indices differ in their sensitivity to inequalities in different parts of the distribution: GINI is 
more sensitive to inequalities at the middle of the distribution, 2C  is more sensitive to 
inequalities at the top of the distribution and 2A  is more sensitive to inequalities at the 
bottom of the distribution. Therefore, each index captures different aspects of inequality.   
 
In our model, households have the following income sources ( k ): 
1) labour ( 1k ): (1 ) ( )W L LE H HEw N w N      
2) unemployment benefits ( 2k ): ( )LU HUub N N   
3) profits ( 3k ): BPDP   
4) interest ( 4k ): 1 1 1( )M HE HU Er M M M       
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To capture and evaluate the impact of each income source on inequality, we decompose 
inequality by income source. The decomposition enables us to define total inequality as the 
sum of the contributions of each source: 
 
 kSI                                                                                                                             (61) 
 
where I  is the total inequality and kS  is the absolute contribution of the income source k to 
total inequality ( 4,3,2,1k ). The relative contribution of the income source k to total inequality 
( ks ) is written as: 
 
k
k
S
s
I
                                                                                                                                  (62) 
 
Suitable values of ks  are derived using decomposition rules. Employing Shorrock’s (1982, 
1983) suggested decomposition rule, the relative contribution of the income source k to total 
inequality is estimated as: 
 
2
cov( , )k k k
k
y y
s
 


                                                                                                    (63) 
 
where cov( , )ky y  is the covariance between the income of each household from source k ( ky ) 
and the total disposable income of each household ( y ), 2  and   denote, respectively, the 
variance and the standard deviation of the total disposable income of households, 
k  is the 
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standard deviation of income source k and k  is the correlation between the income of each 
household from source k and the total disposable income of the household. 
 
Following the common practice in the related literature (e.g. Jenkins 1995; Jännti 1997; 
Papatheodorou 1998; Fräßdorf, Grabka and Schwarze 2011; García-Peñalosa and Orgiazzi 
2013), the decomposition is performed using the squared coefficient of variation as inequality 
index. Therefore, the absolute contribution of income source k to total inequality ( CkS ) is 
estimated as: 
 
2 2 2
2
C k k
k k k k kS s C fs C C
  


 
                                                                               (64) 
 
where kfs  is the factor share given by the ratio  /k  ( k  is the mean income from source k) 
and 2kC  is the squared coefficient of variation of source k. Note that 
222 C  and 
222
kkkC  . 
 
5. Simulation exercises 
 
The model presented in Section 3 has been solved using numerical simulations.
8
 In the 
simulations the model is allowed to operate sequentially until a steady state is reached. The 
values for the parameters and the exogenous variables are reported in Appendix A.
9 
These 
values (as well as the initial values for the endogenous variables) have been selected so as to 
obtain a steady state with plausible values for the endogenous variables. The steady-state 
values of the key endogenous variables are reported in Appendix B.
10 
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 At 0t   we impose two shocks that reflect exogenous changes in the functional distribution 
of income: (1) a rise in 0w , which may stem from institutional changes in the labour market 
that push up the wage share of low-skilled workers; (2) an increase in the dividend payout 
ratio of firms ( fs1 ), which in the related literature is associated with financialisation (see, 
e.g., van Treeck 2009 and Hein and van Treeck, 2010). The simulations illustrate how these 
exogenous changes in functional income distribution influence personal income distribution 
in the short run and the long run. They also show the feedback effects of personal income 
distribution on functional income distribution.  
 
The interaction between functional and personal income distribution relies to a significant 
extent on the macroeconomic effects of the alterations in functional income distribution. 
These effects depend crucially on the sensitivity of the investment rate to the rate of retained 
profits and the utilisation rate (see equation 46). When the sensitivity to the utilisation rate is 
relatively high and the sensitivity to the profit rate is relatively low, investment is more likely 
to increase as a result of a rise in the wage share of low-skilled workers: the favourable effects 
on consumption (and, thus, on utilisation rate) are more likely to outweigh the adverse effects 
on the profit rate. Moreover, in this case there is a higher likelihood that investment will 
increase as a result of an increase in the dividend payout ratio, which places upward pressures 
on consumption and downward pressures on the rate of retained profits. On the other hand, 
when the sensitivity of the investment rate to the profit rate is relatively high and the 
sensitivity of the utilisation rate is relatively low, investment is more likely to decline when 
the wage share of low-skilled workers and the dividend payout ratio increase.  
 
24 
 
 
 
Therefore, in our simulations a distinction is made between two cases: 
 Case I: The sensitivity of the investment rate to the rate of retained profits is relatively low 
and the sensitivity of the investment rate to the utilisation rate is relatively high ( 5.01 d  
and 03.02 d ). 
  Case II: The sensitivity of the investment rate to the rate of retained profits is relatively 
high and the sensitivity of the investment rate to the utilisation rate is relatively low 
( 5.11 d  and 01.02 d ).  
 
The parameters values in Case I are more conducive to a wage-led investment and demand 
regime than the parameter values in Case II, which are more conducive to a profit-led 
investment and demand regime (for a description of these regimes see Lavoie and 
Stockhammer, 2013).
11
 
 
The simulation results are presented in Figures 1-4. With the exception of the factor shares 
and the absolute contribution to inequality, all the other variables are expressed as a ratio of 
their steady-state values in the baseline solution. For the definition of the variables that are 
presented in these figures and are not captured by the equations described in Sections 3 and 4, 
see Appendix B.  
 
5.1 Effects of the wage shock 
 
Figure 1 shows the impact of a rise in the exogenous component of low-skilled workers’ wage 
share under Case I. As expected, immediately after the shock, the share of labour income in 
total household income increases (Figure 1a). This is the main reason behind the initial 
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reduction of the absolute contribution of profits to total inequality (Figure 1b). The shock is 
beneficial to the wage rate of low-skilled workers but has conflicting effects on the wage rate 
of high-skilled workers: on the one hand, their base wage rate increases but, on the other 
hand, their remuneration linked with the profits of firms is adversely affected. Moreover, the 
shock has clearly negative effects on the income of entrepreneurs-capital owners since the 
distributed profits of firms are driven down.  As a consequence, in the first periods after the 
shock the income of entrepreneurs-capital owners decreases relative to the income of high-
skilled and low-skilled workers; furthermore, the ratio of the income of high-skilled to low-
skilled workers declines (Figure 1c).  
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
These developments place downward pressures on total inequality. As shown in Figure 1d, 
inequality falls according to all indices. Remarkably, in the first periods after the shock the 
drop in inequality is higher according to 2C  (which is more sensitive to changes in 
entrepreneurs-capital owners’ income) and ( 2)A    (which is particularly sensitive to changes in 
low-skilled workers’ incomes). This happens because the income of entrepreneurs-capital 
owners and low-skilled workers are mostly affected by the shock.  
 
Figures 1e-1h show the macroeconomic effects of the shock. The wage share of low-skilled 
workers increases; there is also initially a slight increase in the wage share of high-skilled 
workers (Figure 1e). This redistribution of income towards households with a higher 
propensity to consume reduces the aggregate saving ratio (Figure 1e) and boosts consumption 
(Figure 1f). In Case I the sensitivity of the investment rate to the rate of retained profits is 
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relatively low while the sensitivity to the utilisation rate is relatively high. Consequently, the 
investment rate increases since the rise in the utilisation rate (triggered by the higher 
consumption rate) overcompensates the decline in the rate of retained profits (which is shown 
in Figure 1h). The rise in consumption and investment trigger an increase in the growth rate 
of output and a decline in the unemployment rate (Figure 1g). Overall, in the first periods, the 
wage shock reduces inequality and increases macroeconomic activity.  
 
However, there are some important medium-run and long-run effects. Since investment 
increases despite the reduction in the rate of retained profits, the indebtedness of firms is 
adversely affected: the loans-to-output ratio starts increasing some periods after the shock 
(Figure 1h). Since loans are equal to deposits in the model (see equation 57r), the deposits-to-
output ratio also increases.  
 
The rise in /L Y and /D Y  affects the income share of both entrepreneurs-capital owners and 
high-skilled workers. In particular, the income share of entrepreneurs-capital owners is 
positively affected primarily because the output share of bank profits and entrepreneurs-
capital owners’ interest payments tend to increase; it is negatively affected because the rise in 
/L Y  tends to reduce the profits of firms. In our model the positive effects overcompensate the 
negative ones basically because the entrepreneurs-capital owners receive only a part of firms’ 
profits while they receive all bank profits.  
 
The income share of high-skilled workers is negatively affected since the rise in /L Y  tends to 
reduce their remuneration linked with the profits of firms; it is positively affected due to the 
rise in the output share of their interest payments. Since in our simulations, the deposit 
27 
 
 
 
interest rate is relatively low, the negative effects dominate and, hence, the rise in /L Y  
reduces the income share of high-skilled workers.  
 
The income share of high-skilled workers is also negatively affected by the rise in the rate of 
capacity utilisation. Using equations (38) and (42), it can be easily shown that the wage share 
of high-skilled employed workers (given by the ratio [( ) / ]H HEw N Y )  is inversely linked with 
the rate of capacity utilisation. Intuitively, this happens because the demand for high-skilled 
workers depends on *Y and not on Y . Hence, for Hw , H  and 
*Y  given, an increase in output 
(and thus in utilisation rate) leaves the wage bill of high-skilled workers unchanged.  
 
As a result of the aforementioned developments, the wage share of high-skilled workers 
declines after the initial slight increase (Figure 1e); moreover, after the initial fall, the income 
of entrepreneurs-capital owners gradually increases relative to the income of workers (Figure 
1c). Therefore, there is an increase in the absolute contribution of profits to inequality (Figure 
1b) and, thus, a rise in inequality (Figure 1d). Remarkably, the rise in the squared coefficient 
of variation is much more important than the rise in the other two inequality indices (Figure 
1d). The main reason is that 2C  is more responsive to changes in the upper part of the income 
distribution. An additional reason is that the decline in the wage share of high-skilled workers 
places downward pressures on ( 2)A    and probably on GINI.  
 
The continuous decline in the profit rate of firms, due to an increase in their indebtedness, 
ultimately brings about a fall in the investment rate. This rate gradually goes back to its 
baseline level (Figure 1f). The same happens with the growth rate of output (Figure 1g). As a 
result, in the very long run (after the first 100 periods) the economy converges to a new steady 
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state. In the new steady state 2C  is higher than its initial value, but ( 2)A    and GINI are below 
their baseline levels.    
 
Figure 2 shows the effects of the wage shock under Case II. The initial effects on inequality 
are almost identical to Case I. Nonetheless, there are some noteworthy differences in the 
macroeconomic outcomes. Since the sensitivity of the investment rate to the rate of retained 
profits is relatively high and the sensitivity to the utilisation rate is relatively low, the 
investment rate now becomes lower than in the baseline solution (Figure 2f). Therefore, 
shortly after the initial increase, the utilisation rate and the growth rate of output drop for 
some periods, following the decline in investment (see Figures 2f and 2g); in addition, the 
unemployment rate of low-skilled workers increases, reducing their bargaining power and, 
therefore, their wage share (Figure 2e).
12
 As a result, the share of labour in total household 
income declines after the initial increase (Figure 2a) and there is also a rise in the absolute 
contribution of profits to total inequality (Figure 2b). This produces an increase in inequality 
according to all indices (Figure 2d).  
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
Gradually, profitability starts recovering (Figure 2h) due to the positive effects of the wage 
shock on consumption and, thus, on utilisation rate (Figure 2f). The rise in the rate of retained 
profits pushes the investment rate upwards with positive feedback effects on utilisation rate 
and consumption rate. This induces a rise in the growth rate of output and a decline in the 
unemployment rate of low-skilled workers (Figure 2g). Importantly, the increase in economic 
activity is accompanied by an only slight increase in the loans-to-output ratio in the long run 
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(Figure 2h): compared with Case I, the change in the investment rate is much more in line 
with the change in profitability. Consequently, although there is a redistribution of income 
towards the entrepreneurs-capital owners (Figure 2c), which increases inequality (Figure 2d), 
this redistribution is less important than in Case I. In the very long run all indices remain 
below their baseline levels.   
 
5.2 Effects of the dividend payout ratio shock 
 
We now turn to the effects of an exogenous increase in the dividend payout ratio of firms 
under Case I. Since this increase produces a rise in the distributed profits of firms, in the first 
periods after the shock the share of profits in household income increases and the share of 
labour declines (Figure 3a). As a result of this change in functional income distribution, the 
absolute contribution of profits to total inequality increases (Figure 3b), the income of 
entrepreneurs-capital owners becomes higher relative to the income of low-skilled and high-
skilled workers (Figure 3c) and personal income distribution becomes more dispersed (Figure 
3d). As expected, 2C  increases more than the other two indices due to its higher sensitivity to 
income changes at the top of the distribution. 
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
 
The macroeconomic effects of the shock are similar to those reported in Figure 1.  The rise in 
distributed profits increases the income of entrepreneurs-capital owners, leading to higher 
consumption (Figure 3f). Owing to the higher consumption, the utilisation rate increases 
producing a rise in the investment rate, after the initial decline (Figure 3f); this happens 
because in Case I the sensitivity of the investment rate to the utilisation rate is relatively high 
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while the sensitivity to the rate of retained profits is relatively low. Consequently, the growth 
rate of output increases and the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers falls (Figure 3g). 
The latter causes an increase in the wage share of low skilled workers (Figure 3e), producing 
after some periods a passing decline in inequality (Figure 3d).   
 
In the long run, the decoupling of the investment rate from the rate of retained profits causes a 
rise in the loans-to-output ratio (Figure 3h). Combined with the increase in the utilisation rate, 
this produces an increase in the income share of entrepreneurs-capital owners (the reasons are 
similar to those mentioned in Section 5.1). Therefore, over time the redistribution of income 
towards the entrepreneurs-capital owners produces an additional rise in inequality, which is 
primarily reflected in 2C .  
 
In Case II, the initial effects of the dividend payout ratio shock are the same as those observed 
in Case I: inequality increases according to all indices (Figure 4d). Nonetheless, after the very 
first periods the decline in economic activity (Figure 4g) and the increase in the loans-to-
output ratio (Figure 4h), generated by the fall in the rate of retained profits, have a detrimental 
impact on the wage share of low-skilled workers (Figure 4e) and a beneficial impact on the 
household income share of entrepreneurs-capital owners (Figure 4c). As a result, the initial 
increase in inequality is reinforced (Figure 4d).   
 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
 
After some periods, the rise in the utilisation rate and the growth rate of output reduces the 
unemployment rate of low-skilled workers (Figure 4g), increasing their wage share (Figure 
4e). Moreover, the loans-to-output ratio falls (Figure 4h), placing downward pressures on the 
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household income share of entrepreneurs-capital owners (Figure 4c). Consequently, a small 
decline in inequality is reported (Figure 4d). In the long run, however, inequality increases 
again slightly (due to the small rise in the loans-to-output ratio) and all inequality indices 
stabilise at a new steady state in which their value is higher than the pre-shock level.   
 
5.3 Additional remarks  
 
Three additional remarks are in order. First, as Figures 1c, 2c, 3c and 4c indicate, the deposit 
ratio (i.e. the ratio of per household deposits of entrepreneurs-capital owners to per household 
deposits of high-skilled workers) follows with a time lag the changes in the respective income 
ratio. The reason is straightforward: when the income gap between these two household 
groups decreases (increases) the same happens in the saving gap and therefore in the deposit 
gap (given that the substitution between deposits and equities on the part of entrepreneurs-
capital owners is not significant enough). At the same time, any reduction (increase) in the 
deposit ratio tends to reduce (increase) the interest income of entrepreneurs-capital owners 
relative to the interest income of high-skilled workers, further reducing the income gap 
between these types of households and, thereby, the deposit ratio. This implies that the 
accumulation of wealth can magnify the initial personal income distribution effects of a 
change in functional income distribution. Notice that it is precisely the use of the stock-flow 
consistent framework that allows us to capture the dynamic interaction between wealth and 
income distribution and its implications for the link between functional and personal income 
distribution.  
 
Second, the medium-run and long-run effects of the shocks, which are associated with 
macroeconomic developments, indicate why the link between functional and personal income 
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distribution is necessary to be explored within the structure of a complete macroeconomic 
system. The macroeconomic channels are capable of modifying the initial impacts of 
functional on personal income distribution. Therefore, the non-consideration of these channels 
would render the analysis static, partial and, potentially, misleading.   
 
Third, although the starting point in our simulations is a shock that captures changes in 
functional income distribution, our exercises do not solely consider the effects of functional 
on personal income distribution: they also encapsulate the feedback effects of personal on 
functional income distribution. For instance, when a change in functional income distribution 
leads to lower unemployment, various unemployed workers become employed and personal 
income distribution tends to become less dispersed. This, in turn, leads to a higher 
consumption that affects macroeconomic activity and, hence, functional income distribution. 
Another example is when the initial change in functional income distribution induces a 
redistribution of interest income from entrepreneurs-capital owners towards high-skilled 
workers. This change in personal income distribution affects consumption and, therefore, 
functional income distribution through the various macroeconomic channels.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The absence of an integrated framework that connects functional with personal income 
distribution constitutes a major gap in modern economic theory. Using an SFC macro 
modelling framework, we put forward a benchmark platform that provides the basis for a 
fresh theoretical look at the links between the two types of income distribution. The distinct 
feature of the suggested platform is the rigorous modelling of the stock-flow interactions in 
the economy. This permits the formulation of the links between functional and personal 
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income distribution as part of a complete macroeconomic system. It also enables the explicit 
consideration of the income-wealth interrelationship.  
 
With the aid of simulations, we explored the effects of a wage and a dividend payout ratio 
shock on personal income distribution. The purpose of the simulation analysis was to reveal 
the various complex ways through which functional and personal income distribution interact 
and to highlight the crucial role played by the macroeconomic system. According to the 
results, an increase in the exogenous component of the wage share of low-skilled workers (for 
example, due to changes in labour market institutions) reduces inequality in the short run. In 
the medium to long run, inequality starts increasing, but remains below the initial level in 
almost all cases. This rise stems from the fall in profitability that either increases the 
indebtedness of firms (benefiting the top incomes) or reduces investment and employment 
(driving down the wage share). Therefore, although policies that increase low wages seem 
generally to produce a decline in inequality, their beneficial effects can be less significant in 
the long run than in the short run.  
 
An increase in the dividend payout ratio of firms (for example, due to financialisation) 
benefits, in the short run, the income of entrepreneurs-capital owners leading to higher 
inequality. In the medium to long run, the initial increase in inequality is (to a larger or lower 
extent) reinforced either due to the decline in investment and employment or due to the 
increase in the indebtedness of firms.  
 
The benchmark model developed here opens the avenue for further research. An important 
line of inquiry involves the introduction of more micro-based behaviours and structures into 
the model of this paper. The recently developed agent-based modelling (see e.g., Lengnick 
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2013) can prove a useful platform in this direction. The consideration of more complex 
macroeconomic relationships and financial structures is also an obvious direction for future 
research, as alluded to in Section 3. These extensions can be part of a broad research 
programme geared towards the establishment of a more thorough understanding of the 
complex links between functional and personal income distribution. 
35 
 
 
 
References 
 
Atkinson, A.B. 2009. “Factor shares: The principal problem of political economy?” Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 25 (1): 3-16. 
Backus, D., W.C. Brainard, G. Smith, and J. Tobin. 1980. “A model of U.S. financial and 
nonfinancial economic behavior.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12 (2): 259-293. 
Carvalho, L., and A. Rezai. 2014. “Personal income inequality and aggregate demand.” 
Department of Economics, University of São Paulo, Working paper 2014-23.  
Cassetti, M. (2003). “Bargaining power, effective demand and technical progress.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 27 (3): 449-464.  
Checchi, D., and C. García-Peñalosa. 2010. “Labour market institutions and the personal 
distribution of income in the OECD.” Economica 77 (307): 413-450. 
Cripps, F., and W. Godley. 1976. “A formal analysis of the Cambridge Economic Policy 
Group model.” Economica 43 (172): 335-348.  
Dafermos, Y. 2012. “Liquidity preference, uncertainty, and recession in a stock-flow 
consistent model.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 34 (4): 749-776. 
Dagum, C. 1999. “Linking functional and personal distributions of income.” In Handbook of 
Income Inequality, edited by J. Silber, 101-128. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Daudey, E., and C. García-Peñalosa. 2007. “The personal and the factor distributions of 
income in a cross-section of countries.” Journal of Development Studies 43 (5): 812-829. 
Dutt, A.K. 1984. “Stagnation, income distribution and monopoly power.” Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 8 (1): 25-40.   
36 
 
 
 
Fräßdorf, A., M.M. Grabka, and J. Schwarze. 2011. “The impact of household capital income 
on income inequality-a factor decomposition analysis for the UK, Germany and the USA.” 
Journal of Economic Inequality 9 (1): 35-56. 
García-Peñalosa, C., and E. Orgiazzi. 2013. “Factor components of inequality: A cross-
country study.” Review of Income and Wealth 59 (4): 689-727.  
Godley, W. 1999. “Money and credit in a Keynesian model of income determination.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23 (4): 393-411. 
Godley, W., and M. Lavoie. 2007. Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, 
Money, Income, Production and Wealth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hein, E. 2014. Distribution and Growth after Keynes: A Post-Keynesian Guide, Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.  
Hein, E., and T. van Treeck. 2010. “Financialisation and rising shareholder power in 
Kaleckian/post-Kaleckian models of distribution and growth.” Review of Political 
Economy 22 (2): 205-233.  
Jännti, M. 1997. “Inequality in five countries in the 1980s: The role of demographic markets 
and government policies.” Economica 64 (255): 415-440. 
Jenkins, S.P. 1995. “Accounting for inequality trends: Decomposition analyses for the UK, 
1971-86. ” Economica 62 (245): 29-63. 
Lavoie, M. 2009. “Cadrisme within a post-Keynesian model of distribution and growth.” 
Review of Political Economy 21 (3): 369-391. 
Lavoie, M., and W. Godley. 2001-2. “Kaleckian models of growth in a coherent stock-flow 
monetary framework: A Kaldorian view.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 24 (2): 
277-312. 
Lavoie, M., and E. Stockhammer. 2013. “Wage-led growth: Concept, theories and policies.” 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 41, ILO.  
37 
 
 
 
Le Heron, E., and T. Mouakil. 2008. “A Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent model for 
dynamic analysis of monetary policy shock on banking behaviour.” Metroeconomica 59 
(3): 405-440. 
Lengnick, M. 2013. “Agent-based macroeconomics: A baseline model.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 86: 102-120.  
Lima, G.T. 2012. “A neo-Kaleckian model of profit sharing, capacity utilization and 
economic growth.” Metroeconomica 63 (1): 92-108.    
Naastepad, C.W.M. 2006. “Technology, demand and distribution: A cumulative growth 
model with an application to the Dutch productivity growth slowdown.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 30 (3): 403-434. 
OECD 2011. “From household income earnings to disposable household income inequality.” 
In Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, 225-258, OECD Publishing.  
Palley, T.I. 2015. “The middle class in macroeconomics and growth theory: A three-class 
neo-Kaleckian-Goodwin model.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 39 (1): 221-243. 
Papatheodorou, C. 1998. “Inequality in Greece: An analysis by income source.” Discussion 
Paper DARP No. 39, STICERD, LSE.  
Piketty, T. 2014. Capital in the 21
st
 Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
Rowthorn, B. 1982. “Demand, real wages and economics growth.” Studi Economici, 18: 3-53.   
Ryoo, S. and P. Skott. 2008. “Financialization in Kaleckian economies with and without labor 
constraints.” European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 5 (2): 
357-386.  
Schlenker, E. and K.D. Schmid. 2013. “Capital income shares and income inequality in the 
European Union.” IMK working paper 119, Macroeconomic Policy Institute at the Hans-
Boeckler Foundation.   
38 
 
 
 
Shorrocks, A.F. 1982. “Inequality decomposition by factor components.” Econometrica 50 
(1): 193-212.  
Shorrocks, A.F. 1983. “The impact of income components on the distribution of family 
incomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (2): 311-326.  
Stockhammer, E. 2004. “Is there an equilibrium rate of unemployment?” Review of Political 
Economy 16 (1): 59-77.  
Tobin, J. 1982. “Money and finance in the macroeconomic process.” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 14 (2): 171-204.  
van Treeck, T. 2009. “A synthetic, stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model of 
‘financialisation’.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (3): 467-493. 
Weitzman, M.L. 1985. “The simple macroeconomics of profit sharing.” American Economic 
Review 75(5): 937-953.   
Wolff, E.N. and A. Zacharias. 2013. “Class structure and economic inequality.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 37 (6): 1381-1406 
Zezza, G. 2008. “US growth, the housing market, and the distribution of income.” Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics 30 (3): 375-401. 
39 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
1. These effects of functional income distribution on macroeconomic activity have been 
extensively investigated in modern post-Keynesian approaches that draw on the analyses of 
Kaldor, Kalecki, Pasinetti, Robinson and Steindl (see Hein 2014 for a recent review). 
2. Instead of categorising workers between low-skilled and high-skilled ones, another option 
would be to adopt the distinction between workers (or non-supervisory labour) and managers 
(or supervisory labour) (see, e.g., Lavoie 2009; Palley 2015). This, however, would not 
change the essence of the arguments developed in the paper. 
3. These extensions can draw on the works of Godley and Lavoie (2007), Le Heron and 
Mouakil (2008), Zezza (2008), van Treeck (2009) and Dafermos (2012). 
4.  Due to the simplifying assumption that all households that belong to the same group have 
the same deposits (which are equal to the average deposits of the group), the formulation of 
deposit transfers suffers from a minor drawback when some unemployed become employed 
and then some employed become unemployed. In this case, those that become unemployed 
bring with them an amount of deposits that is lower than the amount actually accumulated, 
because the average deposits of the employed have been previously reduced due to the inflow 
of unemployed into employed. A similar issue exists when some employed become 
unemployed and then some unemployed become employed. However, it should be pointed 
out that these issues are of minor importance since they can only marginally affect the results 
of our analysis.     
5. For simplicity, we do not consider the potential beneficial effects of profit sharing on 
labour productivity. See Lima (2012) for a discussion and a formulation of these effects.  
6.
 
See Weitzman (1985) and Lima (2012) for similar specifications. 
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7. Note that )(gh   and 0)(' g . Since h  is a function of  , we have that )(fsP  . It is 
also posited that 0)(' f .  
8. The EViews code is available upon request. 
9. In the simulations the population is constant. Low-skilled workers, high-skilled workers 
and entrepreneurs-capital owners represent 55%, 40% and 5% of the total number of 
households, respectively. A slightly different composition would imply different steady-state 
values for the inequality indices but would not change the core results of the simulation 
exercises.      
10. The steady-state values of the inequality indices are low (relative to those observed in 
reality) primarily because our model captures only inter-group inequality and not intra-group 
inequality. An additional reason is that the total wage share is relatively high.  
11. Given the importance of the investment function for the macro channels through which 
functional and personal income distribution interact, future extensions of the model could 
make use of more complicated investment functions and consider more cases based on the 
responsiveness of investment to various factors (such as the Tobin’s q, the leverage ratio and 
the employment rate). The analyses in Ryoo and Skott (2008) and van Treeck (2009) could be 
a starting point for these extensions.       
12. The unemployment rate of high-skilled workers increases due to the adverse impact of 
lower investment activity on capital stock. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Balance sheet matrix 
 
 
Low-skilled 
employed 
workers
Low-skilled 
unemployed 
workers
High-skilled 
employed 
workers
High-skilled 
unemployed 
workers
Entrepreneurs-
capital owners
Deposits +M HE +M HU +M E +M F -M 0
Equities +e ∙p e -e ∙p e 0
Loans -L +L 0
Capital +K +K
Total (net worth) 0 0 +ΜHE +ΜHU +V E +V F +M F 0 +K
Households of Firms Unemployment 
fund
Commercial 
banks
Total
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Table 2: Transactions matrix 
 
Total
Low-skilled 
employed 
workers
Low-skilled 
unemployed 
workers
High-skilled 
employed 
workers
High-skilled 
unemployed 
workers
Entrepreneurs-
capital owners
Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption -C L Ε -C L U -C H E -C H U -C E +C 0
Investment +I -I 0
Wages +w L ∙Ν LE +w Η ∙N ΗE -W 0
Unemployment benefits +ub∙N LU +ub∙N HU -UB 0
Firms' profits +DP -TP +RP 0
Commercial banks' profits +BP -BP 0
Contributions -τ W ∙w L ∙N LE -τ W ∙w Η ∙N ΗE -τ F ∙W +CO 0
Deposit transfers +MT -MT 0
Interest on deposits +r M ∙M H E-1 +r M ∙M H U-1 +r M ∙M Ε -1  +r M ∙M F -1 -r M ∙M -1 0
Interest on loans -r L ∙L -1 +r L ∙L -1 0
Δdeposits -ΔMΗ E -ΔMHU -ΔM Ε -ΔM F +ΔM 0
Δequities -Δe ∙p e +Δe ∙p e 0
Δloans +ΔL -ΔL 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firms Commercial banksHouseholds of Unemployment 
fund
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Figure 1. Effects of an increase in the exogenous component of the low-skilled workers’ 
wage share, Case I
 
(a) Factor shares 
 
 
(c) Income ratios and deposit ratio 
 
 
 
(e) Wage share and aggregate saving ratio 
 
 
(g) Unemployment rates and growth rate of output 
 
 
(b) Absolute contribution to inequality 
 
 
(d) Inequality indices 
 
 
(f) Utilisation, consumption and investment rate 
 
 
(h) Rate of retained profits and loans-to-output ratio 
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Figure 2. Effects of an increase in the exogenous component of the low-skilled workers’ 
wage share, Case II
 
(a) Factor shares 
 
 
(c) Income ratios and deposit ratio 
 
 
 
(e) Wage share and aggregate saving ratio 
 
 
(g) Unemployment rates and growth rate of output 
 
 
(b) Absolute contribution to inequality 
 
 
(d) Inequality indices 
 
 
(f) Utilisation, consumption and investment rate 
 
 
(h) Rate of retained profits and loans-to-output ratio 
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Figure 3. Effects of an increase in the dividend payout ratio, Case I 
 
(a) Factor shares 
 
 
(c) Income ratios and deposit ratio 
 
 
 
 
(e) Wage share and aggregate saving ratio 
 
 
(g) Unemployment rates and growth rate of output 
 
 
(b) Absolute contribution to inequality 
 
 
(d) Inequality indices 
 
 
(f) Utilisation, consumption and investment rate 
 
 
(h) Rate of retained profits and loans-to-output ratio 
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Figure 4. Effects of an increase in the dividend payout ratio, Case II 
 
(a) Factor shares 
 
 
(c) Income ratios and deposit ratio 
 
 
 
(e) Wage share and aggregate saving ratio 
 
 
(g) Unemployment rates and growth rate of output 
 
 
(b) Absolute contribution to inequality 
 
 
(d) Inequality indices 
 
 
(f) Utilisation, consumption and investment rate 
 
 
(h) Rate of retained profits and loans-to-output ratio 
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Appendix A: Values for parameters and exogenous variables in the simulation exercises 
N L =550,000 x =0.045
N H =400,000 r M =0.01
N E =50,000 spr =0.025
N =1,000,000 g λ =0.02
τ W = 0.03 w 1 =0.24
τ F = 0.03 m W =1.6
ξ= 0.6  ρ =0.3 
v =0.125  h =(0.2/ρ )+0.3
c HE1 =0.8 d 0 =-0.012 
c HE2 =0.08 d 1 =0.5 (Case I)
c HU1 =0.9 d 1 =1.5 (Case II)
c HU2 =0.25 d 2 =0.03 (Case I)
c E1 =0.6 d 2 =0.01 (Case II)
c E2 =0.04 w 0 =0.34 (before the wage shock)
λ 0 =0.56 w 0 =0.345 (after the wage shock)
λ 1 =0.3 s f =0.66 (before the dividend payout ratio shock)
λ 2 =0.3 s f =0.64 (after the dividend payout ratio shock)
λ 3 =0.05  
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Appendix B: Steady-state values of key endogenous variables in the simulation exercises 
 
Variable Mathematical expression Steady-state value
Labour's share in total household income [(1-τ W )∙(w L ∙ N LE +w H ∙ N H E )]/Y T 0.80
Unemployment benefits' share in total household income UB/Y T 0.05
Profits' share in total household income (DP+BP)/Y T 0.14
Interest's share in total household income [r M ∙ (M HE-1 +M HU-1 +M E-1 )]/Y T 0.01
Labour's absolute contribution to inequality See equation (64) 0.00
Unemployment benefits' absolute contribution to inequality See equation (64) -0.02
Profits' absolute contribution to inequality See equation (64) 0.28
Interest's absolute contribution to inequality See equation (64) 0.01
Income ratio: high-skilled to low-skilled workers [(Y HE +Y HU )/N H ]/[(Y LE +Y LU )/N L ] 1.61
Income ratio: enterpreneurs-capital owners to low-skilled workers YH E /[(Y LE +Y LU )/N L ] 4.15
Income ratio: enterpreneurs-capital owners to high-skilled workers YH E /[(Y HE +Y HU )/N H ] 2.58
Deposit ratio: enterpreneurs-capital owners to high-skilled workers (M E /N E )/[(M HE +M HU )/N H ] 3.56
Gini coefficient See equation (58) 0.22
Squared coefficient of variation See equation (59) 0.27
Atkinson index (ε =2) See equation (60) 0.15
Wage share of low-skilled workers (w L ∙N LE )/Y 0.31
Wage share of high-skilled workers (w H ∙N HE )/Y 0.37
Total wage share (w L ∙N LE +w H ∙N HE )/Y 0.68
Aggregate saving ratio (Y-C )/Y 0.20
Investment rate I /K 0.02
Consumption rate C /K 0.08
Capacity utilisation rate See equation (42) 0.79
Unemployment rate of low-skilled workers See equation (5) 0.12
Unemployment rate of high-skilled workers See equation (18) 0.07
Growth rate of output (Y -Y -1 )/Y -1 0.02
Firms' rate of retained profits RP/K 0.016
Loans-to-output ratio L/Y 1.54
Total unemployment rate of workers (N LU +N HU )/(N L +N H ) 0.10
Firms' rate of profit TP/K 0.024
Firms' leverage ratio L/K 0.15
Rate of return on equity See equation (27) 0.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
